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Notes
SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150:
A Critical Analysis
Without soliciting prior public comment, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) publicly issued Accounting Series Release No. 150'
(ASR 150) on December 20, 1973. In that release the Commission reaf-
firmed an earlier policy statement contained in Accounting Series
Release No. 42 (ASR 4) that financial statements, prepared in accordance
with accounting principles for which there is no substantial authoritative
support, will be presumed misleading, and that footnotes or other
disclosures will not avoid this presumption. ASR 150 states, for purposes
of the policy contained in ASR 4, that pronouncements of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board3 (FASB) will be considered by the Commis-
sion as having substantial authoritative support. However, ASR 150 fur-
ther states that accounting practices contrary to any FASB promulga-
tions will be considered as not having substantial authoritative support
and will consequently be presumed misleading.
On June 15, 1976, Arthur Andersen & Co. (Andersen)4 filed a petition
with the SEC requesting that ASR 150 and another release, ASR 177, 5 by
'5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 172,172 (Dec. 20, 1973). In 1972 the SEC amended Rule 1-01(a)
of Regulation S-X to provide for the incorporation therein of all Accounting Series
Releases which currently number over 247.
25 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,005 (April 25, 1938).
3The Financial Accounting Standards Board was empowered by the American Institute
of Certified Public Accounts (AICPA) effective July 1, 1973, to establish accounting prin-
ciples to be known as Statements of Financial Accounting Standards. FASB succeeded
two prior bodies of the AICPA which performed essentially the same functions. The Com-
mittee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) existed from 1939 to 1959 when it was succeeded
by the Accounting Principles Board (APB), which continued to function up to the creation
of FASB. The idea for FASB was the result of recommendations of the Study Group on
Establishment of Accounting Principles (commonly known as the Wheat Committee), a
committee appointed by the leaders of the accounting profession who were anxious to
avoid government rule-making in accounting.
The advantages of FASB over its predecessors are that it is not directly answerable to
the AICPA but to the Financial Accounting Foundation, a private organization, that its
members are full time employees of the Board, and that the members are required to sever
all private ties with firms and companies thus helping to assure its independence.
'Arthur Andersen & Co. is an accounting firm which is one of the eight largest
accounting firms in the U.S. and has offices world-wide.
5In ASR 177, 40 Fed. Reg. 46107 (1975) 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,199, the SEC
adopted a revision to Instruction H(f) for Form 10-Q reports which requires the indepen-
dent accountants of an enterprise to indicate, when that enterprise has changed an
accounting principle, "whether or not the change is to an alternative principle which in his
judgment is preferable under the circumstances." Andersen challenged the legality of ASR
177 on the procedural grounds that it was adopted and amended without compliance with
the Administrative Procedure Act and the SEC's own rule-making regulations and on the
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revoked and the term "substantial authoritative support," contained in
ASR 4, be defined through the rule making procedures of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), or alternatively, that ASR 4 be revoked
also. The SEC issued ASR 1936 in response to the petition, denying the
request to revoke ASR 177 and deferring response to the other two re-
quests until public comment had been received on three "basic issues."'7
Two days after the SEC issued ASR 193, Andersen sought a temporary
restraining order in federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of
ASR 150 and ASR 177.8 The court denied the temporary restraining
order on August 13, 1976, as well as a petition for preliminary injunction
on September 3, 1976.3 In an oral opinion the court denied the
preliminary injunction, concluding that ASR 150 should be characterized
"as a method by which the SEC will evaluate accounting principles"'10
and not as a substantive rule. The court did not cite any legal principle or
precedent to support its conclusion.
Andersen's suit for permanent injunction was dismissed on summary
judgment in March of 1978 on the ground that Andersen lacked standing
to sue." The primary concern of the court was whether Andersen had suf-
fered any economic injury as a result of ASR 150 or ASR 177;
substantive grounds that it is arbitrary and capricious because of the burdens it places
upon accountants and their clients. Andersen complained that ASR 177 shifted the
responsibility to make the ultimate business decision of the advisability of an accounting
change from a business standpoint, from the management of the enterprise to the indepen-
dent accountant, which appears incompatible with the requirement that accountants be
"independent". For a discussion of this issue see Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples Instruction H() and the Preferability Issue, 11 VAL. U.L.J. 229 (1977).
65 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72, 215 (July 27, 1976).
Before responding to Andersen's request, the Commission hereby solicits
public comment on the following basic issues raised:
1. Should the Commission continue its policy of recognizing the pro-
nouncements of the Financial Accounting Standards Board as providing a
frame of reference for publicly held companies to satisfy their statutory
disclosure obligations?
2. Should be Commission further define the phrase 'substantial
authoritative support'?
3. Should the Commission further define the phrase accounting principles
and practices used in Rule 2-02(c) of Regulation S-X_[17 CFR 210.2-02(c)]?
Id at 72,215.
'The district court in its opinion on the permanent injunction (See n. 11 infra) stated that
they did not look upon Andersen's quick action with favor. They stated:
An additional reason can be noted briefly that would support restraint in
deciding the merits of the claim against ASR 150.... Plaintiff did not await
the outcome of the SEC's deliberations, but filed this action on July 29, 1976.
We look unfavorably on the fact that plaintiff bypassed the administrative
procedures and sought to bring the question of validity of ASR 150 before the
court prematurely.
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,374 (N.D. Ill. March, 1978).
'The court summarily dismissed Andersen's challenge to ASR 150 in an oral opinion.
Arthur Andersen v. SEC, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,720 (N.D.
Ill., Sept. 3, 1976).
OI d
"Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC. 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,374 (N.D. II. March,
1978).
[Vol. 54:317
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however,the court also discussed the potential for civil or criminal sanc-
tions because of either ASR 150 or ASR 177 but summarily dismissed
that possibility in one paragraph. 12 In considering the risk of sanctions
because of ASR 150, the court referred to its earlier determination in the
preliminary injunction hearing that ASR 150 was not a substantive rule
and stated that Andersen had not submitted anything subsequent to
that decision to persuade the court to the contrary.
While Andersen failed to carry its burden of persuasion, the court's
analysis is far from convincing that ASR 150 is merely a method by
which the SEC will evaluate accounting principles. ASR 150 may in fact
be a rule. This note explores that possibility, analyzes the scope and
potential legal effect of ASR 150 on accountants and accounting within
the context of SEC Rule 10b-5, and considers the impact of ASR 150
upon the concept of GAAP: "generally accepted accounting principles."
CHARACTERIZATION AND COMPLIANCE
The characterization of ASR 150 determines if there is a legal obliga-
tion upon accountants to comply with the release. If ASR 150 is a state-
ment of policy as the SEC contended in the Andersen suit, accountants
cannot be forced to comply with ASR 150 solely by ASR 150's own man-
date. Some other rule or statute would have to be the source of the obliga-
tion. 3 However, if ASR 150 is a rule it would create an obligation to com-
ply. Thus, the question is whether the mere labeling of a statement as
policy is determinative of its effect.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States,14 directly
addressed this issue. The Court held that the substance of what is done is
controlling, not the label:
The Commission argues that, since its Report characterized
the regulations as announcements of policy, the order pro-
mulgating them is no more subject to review than a press
release similarly announcing its policy. Undoubtedly, regula-
tions adopted in the exercise of the administrative rule-making
power, like laws enacted by legislatures, embody an-
nouncements of policy. But they may be something more.
When, as here, the regulations are avowedly adopted in the ex-
ercise of that power, couched in terms of command and accom-
panied by an announcement of the Commission that the policy
is one "which we will follow in exercising our licensing power,"
they must be taken by those entitled to rely upon them as what
they purport to be-an exercise of the delegated legislative
power-which, until amended, are controlling alike upon the
12Id at p. 93,301.
"Pacific Gas Elec. Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38-40, (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1"316 U.S. 407 (1942).
1979]
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Commission and all others whose rights may be affected by the
Commission's execution of them. 5 (Emphasis added.)
ASR 150 is very similiar to the release in CBS. It states that FASB
pronouncements "will be considered by the Commission as having
substantial authoritative support, and those contrary to such FASB pro-
mulgations will be considered to have no such support." The language is
absolute and "couched in terms of [a] command." There are no words of
discretion allowing SEC staff members to recognize deviations.
Whatever the SEC's intent in promulgating ASR 150, they have created
an absolute command which leaves accountants no choice but to comply.
CBS shows that the label attached to a pronouncement by the issuing
agency does not control the duties imposed upon those within its reach.
However, even if duties flow from a pronouncement, the question arises
whether the rule is law. Professor Davis offers a framework for analyzing
interpretive and legislative rules:16
The law about the distinction ... is quite troublesome, but at
the two extremes the law is quite clear. One very solidproposi-
tion is this: Whenever a legislative body has delegated power
to an agency to make rules having force of law (whether or not
the delegation is explicit) the rules the agency makes pursuant
to the granted power have the same force as a statute if they
are valid, and they are valid if they are constitutional, within
the granted power, and issued pursuant to proper procedure; a
court may no more substitute its judgment as to the content of
a legislative rule than it may substitute its judgment as to the
content of a statute.17
Thus ASR 150 would have the force of law if it is "constitutional, within
the granted power, and issued pursuant to proper procedure." There ap-
pear to be no serious constitutional challenges to ASR 150.18 The power
"Id- at 422.
"
6The terms "interpretative rules" and "legislative rules" are not defined in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. A definition for "interpretative rules" can be found in the At-
torney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (Manual 30, 1977). Reliance
on this manual is well founded as the Attorney General's Office was integrally involved in
the creation of the Administrative Procedure Act. In a footnote the Manual states that
"the following definitions are offered: . . . INTERPRETATIVE RULES - rules or
statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of the
statutes and rules which it administers." On page 126 of ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Davis
states that "the term 'legislative' is now the one in general usuage to designate rules that
are not interpretative."
17K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 126 (3rd ed. 1972) (emphasis added). Davis further
states that "Four Supreme Court cases will show that the law in support of the proposition
thus stated in quite clear." Those cases are: Public Utilities Comm'n. of Calif. v. United
States, 355 U.S. 534, 542 (1958); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962); Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1967); FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289
(1965).
"8Andersen did launch a constitutional challenge to the so-called "delegation of power to
FASB." In its opening brief to support its motion for summary judgment it stated on
pages 23-24 that:
The delegation made in ASR 150 is contrary to the due process clause of the
[Vol. 54:317
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of the SEC to promulgate ASR 150 and accounting rules generally is
plenary.19 That leaves only the question of whether ASR 150 was issued
pursuant to proper procedure, one of the two grounds Andersen relied
upon in challenging ASR 150. Even if ASR 150 is held to have been im-
properly issued in another proceeding, the SEC would probably reissue
ASR 150 in accordance with APA requirements. 20
This authority, together with CBS, leads to the conclusion that when
an administrative agency properly issues a pronouncement that is ab-
solute and certain in its language in an area that is both constitutional
and within the agency's granted power, those subject to the pronounce-
ment are compelled by law to comply with it. The SEC undoubtedly
wants compliance with ASR 150; their only apparent reason for labeling
it a statment of policy was to avoid the public notice and rule-making pro-
cedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. Accordingly, ASR 150
should be characterized as a rule and not a method.
Assuming that ASR 150 has the force of law and correspondingly com-
pels accountants to comply with its terms, what is the standard for com-
pliance? The FASB participated with the SEC on an informal basis in
drafting ASR 150.21 The FASB suggested a rule that would have given
accountants assurance that accounting principles used when following
FASB pronouncements would have substantial authoritative support
and not be presumed misleading under ASR 4. That rule, had it been
adopted, would merely have stated the obvious. However, the SEC
modified the rule so that accounting principles contrary to FASB pro-
nouncements would not have substantial authoritative support and be
presumed misleading. The final language of the rule reads:
For purpose of this policy [ASR 4], principles, standards and
practices promulgated by the FASB in its Statements and In-
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The broad, unreviewed power of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board to make rules legally binding upon
registrants and accountants is broader than any delegation ever sustained by
the federal courts. The line of cases represented by Carter v. Carter Coal Co., -
298 U.S. 238 (1936), has established a firm principle that a governmental
agency cannot delegate rule-making power to a private group.... It is the
failure to have review of the group's action by an agency prior to its effec-
tiveness that has caused the Supreme Court to find a constitutional infirmity
in the delegation. [Citations omitted.] Such failure is present in the instant
case. Each new accounting pronouncement of the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board becomes automatically enforceable by the staff of the SEC upon
its issuance.
""The Commission may prescribe, in regard to reports made pursuant to this chapter,
... the methods to be followed in the preparation of the reports.. ." 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)
(1970). See also 15 U.S.C. 77s(a), 78c(b) (1970).
'°This is what occurred when Andersen successfully challenged the SEC for not comply-
ing with the Administrative Procedure Act when issuing ASR 146. Arthur Andersen & Co.
v. SEC [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94, 147 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 1973)
(summary of complaint). The complaint was voluntarily dismissed after the issuance of
ASR 146A. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 66,123.14. It should be noted that ASR 146A, which
was issued after the proper public proceedings, merely reaffirmed ASR 146.
2'Brief for Plaintiff, Arthur Andersen & Co. v. SEC, supra note 11.
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terpretations will be considered by the Commission as having
subtantial authoritative support, and those contrary to such
FASB promulgations will be considered* to have no such sup-
port.
*It should be noted that Rule 203 of the Rules of Conduct of
the Code of Ethics of the AICPA provides that it is necessary
to depart from accounting principles promulgated by the body
designated by the Council of the AICPA if, due to unusual cir-
cumstances, failure to do so would result in misleading finan-
cial statements. In such a case, the use of other principles may
be accepted or required by the Commission.2 2 (Emphasis
added.)
The footnote creates uncertainty by requiring that one of two sets of ac-
counting principles be used where "circumstances": (1) require the use of
FASB principles, (2) allow the use of non-FASB principles, or (3) require
the use of non-FASB principles.23 This raises the question of when each
accounting principle should be used.
The rule announced in the text of ASR 150 is absolute, while the foot-
note carves out an exception to the rule. The rule appears to be favored
over the exception because it is preferentially positioned in the text and
contains the words "will be considered" rather than "may be accepted or
required." The key to the exception turns on the word "misleading".
However, that one word does not provide sufficient guidance for inter-
pretation. "Misleading" has several possible meanings: its everyday
meaning, a meaning given it by courts in Rule 10b-5 suits, a new meaning
for SEC purposes in accepting finanical reports, or the meaning as it
appears in Rule 203 of the Rules of Conduct of the Code of Ethics of the
AICPA. The latter meaning seems to be preferred since the footnote
directly refers to the standard in Rule 203. However, it seems unlikely
that a court would limit itself to the AICPA meaning. Thus accountants
have a problem of choosing between FASB and non-FASB principles.
Viewed in this context, ASR 150 is not an informative guide, but rather a
rule raising the stakes for an accountant's wrong choice of accounting
principles. If the SEC intended to provide a "safe harbor" for accoun-
tants, they failed to achieve their purpose.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASR 4 AND ASR 150
Any suit by an injured party relying wholly or partially upon ASR 150 will
necessarily involve ASR 4 since the former is an extension of the latter. Thus,
225 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 172,172 (Dec. 20, 1973).
"The term "non-FASB principles" is somewhat inaccurate in that the principles referred
to not only lack connection with FASB they are at least in part contrary to an existing
FASB pronouncement. However, due to convenience the term will be used to refer to these
principles. It should also be noted that FASB pronouncements include the unsuperseded
pronouncements of its predecessor boards.
[Vol. 54:317
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an analysis of their relationship is warranted. The legal considerations ap-
plicable to ASR 150 seems equally applicable to ASR 4 which states:
In cases where financial statements filed with this Commission pur-
suant to its rules and regulations... are prepared in accordance
with accounting principles for which there is no substantial
authoritative support, such financial statements will be presumed
to be misleading or inaccurate despite disclosures contained in the
certificate of the accountant or in footnotes to the statements pro-
vided the matters involved are material ....
There is little textual difference between ASR 150 and ASR 4. They are both
absolute in their language and limit the range of acceptable accounting pro-
cedures. Furthermore, ASR 4 not only restricts accounting principles, but also
restricts disclosure formerly allowed in the certificate of the accountant and in
the footnotes of the statement. Even if there is some legal reason not to con-
sider ASR 4 as having the force of law itself, the same result may be achieved
through ASR 150. ASR 150 restates ASR 4 almost verbatim and expressly
reaffirms it with the words "For the purpose of this policy [ASR 4], principles,
standards, and practices promulgated by the FASB ... will be considered...
as having substantial authoritative support .... " Thus ASR 4 may be con-
sidered as having the force of law either by itself or through incorporation into
ASR 150.
This raises the novel question of whether an accountant could be deemed to
have certified a financial statement that is misleading as a matter of law. It
might be argued that using accounting principles contrary to an FASB pro-
nouncement without proof that unusual circumstances require the exception to
the rule in ASR 150 creates a financial statement presumed to be misleading.
Since the issue of whether a financial statement is misleading is factually dif-
ficult to resolve, such a presumption could be important. If the presumption
could not be overcome, the financial statement could be labeled misleading as
a matter of law. This would be an absurd result and hopefully would not be ac-
cepted by any court.24 However, even if a court did not accept "misleading as
a matter of law," the violation of the duty owed under ASR 150 and the
presumed misleading nature would probably have persuasive impact and in-
crease the likelihood of civil liability.
CIVIL LIABILITY
If an accountant were sued for an impermissible deviation from ASR 150,
the most likely basis for the suit would be a violation of Rule 10b-5.25 ASR 150
would be a valuable tool in establishing the misleading nature of the financial
statement. However, there would be two obstacles to a successful suit. One
21The trouble with the argument is not obvious at first glance. The standard which trig-
gers the exception is not the unusual circumstances but the misleading nature of the finan-
cial statement if other principles were not used. Thus the trigger of the exception is the
same as the presumption.
2517 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1978).
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obstacle would be establishing the theoretical connection between ASR 150
and Rule 10b-5 so that a violation of ASR 150 would create more than just an
inference that the statement was misleading. The second obstacle would be
overcoming the 10b-5 scienter requirement established by Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder.26
The theoretical question can be more generally stated as: What analytical
framework should be used in a 101>5 suit to determine the effect of a violation
of an SEC rule in an area that the SEC dearly has power to regulate? Four ap-
proaches are potentially applicable, by analogy, to a 10b-5 suit. They are:
1) ColonialRealty27 doctrine of implying a cause of action
for violation of an exchange or dealer association rule.
2) Cort 8 doctrine of implying a federal right of action.
3) Tort doctrine that violation of a statute constitutes
prima facie evidence.
4) Sui generis approach.
The implied causes of action are the easiest to dismiss. The Colonial
Realty doctrine is only applicable in the limited situations that almost
always involve fraud.29 It is obvious that ASR 150 violations do not fit
that categorization. Cort requires that four factors be met before a
federal right of action may be implied.3 Because a person injured by a
misleading financial statement would be in the special class to be pro-
tected and the cause of action is not one traditionally relegated to state
law, two of the factors would be met. But a problem arises because ASR
150 is promulgated under the authority of plenary grant of power from
which no legislative intent to create such remedy is indicated except by
inference. The Cort doctrine comes closer than Colonial Realty but still is
too troublesome to be useful.
The tort doctrine that violation of a statute, ordinance, administrative
rule, or traffic regulation constitutes prima facie evidence has several re-
quirments. They are:
1) Injury to a member of the class to be protected.
2) Injury must be due to the hazard the statute or rule
intended to prevent.
2425 U.S. 185 (1976).
"Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 817.
"Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
"Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 797 (1977).
"The four factors are as follows:
(1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted?
(2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create such a remedy or to deny one?
(3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
(4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
[Vol. 54:317
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3) Violation must be the proximate cause of the injury.
4) The statute or rule is intended to set a standard of
conduct for the defendantY1
ASR 150 would clearly meet all the requirements except number 3 which
would have to be established in the materiality determination of each
suit. However, one major problem with this doctrine is that the violation
of the statute generally only establishes negligence which is not suffi-
cient for finding liability under Rule 10b-5.3 2 A more pervasive problem is
establishing the nature of a Rule 10b-5 action since the strength of the
analogy is a function of the relationship between tort law and a Rule
10b-5 action.
Courts have considered whether 10b-5 is closer to tort or con-
tract claim and if it should be treated as an equitable or legal
cause of action. These distinctions assume importance when
state law must be employed as an aid to federal jurisdiction,
but otherwise 10b-5 should be treated as sui generis.
Courts placed great reliance on tort law when they first inter-
preted 10b-5. Although federal law controls, state law was
used as an analogy or was incorporated into 10b-5 because it
was consistent with the aims of the federal securities legisla-
tion. More recently, however, judges have not blindly adopted
common law tort doctrines; instead they have ascertained
whether lOb-5's purposes would be furthered by their assimila-
tion into the Rule.33
Thus, the trend seems to be to consider Rule 10b-5 actions as essentially
sui generis and to rely upon its purposes to establish its parameters. This
injury forms the fourth type of approach.
Rule 10b-5(2) makes it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a
material fact... .-34 This rule plays an important role for investors since
financial statements are heavily relied upon by investors in making in-
vestment decisions. The main purpose of ASR 150 is to prevent the use of
accounting principles which could produce misleading financial
statements. Given this close similarity of purpose, the consideration of
an ASR 150 violation would probably weight heavy in a court's deter-
mination of the misleading nature of the report. However, it would be dif-
ficult to establish that a violation of ASR 150 should be determinative of
the misleading element of a Rule 10b-5 action.
But even if a violation of ASR 150 supplied the misleading element of a
31M. BENDER. NEGLIGENCE. §1.0212]. Note that requirement 4 is optionaL
3 See notes 34-36 infra and accompanying text.
"1 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1OB-5 § 14 (1977).
3'17 CFR §240.10b-5(2).
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INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
10b-5 action, there is another obstacle to a successful 10b-5 suit: Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder 5 Although at least three circuit courts had held that
negligence alone was sufficient for liability under 10b-5,3 6 Hochfelder
established the requirement of "scienter" for such violations and
accordingly held that an action will not lie for negligence alone.
Hochfelder the plaintiffs were suing auditors for not discovering the
unusual mail rule of the president of the company, whereby he was able to
fradulently obtain money from the plaintiffs. Since the complaint alleged
that the auditors were merely negligent, the Court held for the auditors.
It seems that Hochfelder would bar a IOb-5 action brought primarily on a
ASR 150 violation. However, cases since Hochfelder cloud the issue con-
siderably.
Hochfelder expressly left open the question whether recklessness
would meet the scienter requirement. 7 The Court stated:
In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a
form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability
for some act. We need not address here the question whether,
in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil
liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.3 8
But cases decided since Hochfelder have overwhelmingly held that
recklessness will suffice. The court in Steinberg v. Carey" noted,
"Moreover, the Court notes the virtual unanimity of the cases con-
sidering the question since Hochfelder, that reckless conduct meets the
scienter standard in a Rule 10b-5 claim. ' 4 0
The effectiveness of Hochfelder as a bar to accountant's liability has
been eroded by cases holding that recklessness will suffice and more im-
portantly by their definitions of recklessness. In McLean v. Alexander, 41
the plaintiff was a highly sophisticated investor interested in buying all
the stock of a small company involved with laser beam technology. The
"
5Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra note 26.
37The Court also left open the question whether scienter was a necessary element in an
action for injunctive relief under 10b-5.
"Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra note 25, at n. 12.
39439 F. Supp. 1233 (1977).
"°Some of the cases which hold that reckless conduct will meet the scienter requirement
in Rule 10b-5 are: Nelson v. Serwold, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,399 (9th Cir. 1978); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 196,275 (2d Cir. 1978); Wright v.
Heizen Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th
Cir. 1977); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977); Bailey v.
Meister Bran, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1977); Herzfeld v. Lavanthol, Krekstein, Hor-
wath and Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 96,496 (D.C. Del., 1978); Weinberger v. Kendrich, 432 F. Supp. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Stein v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Frenke v.
Midwestern Okl. Div. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (D. Okl. 1976); Coleco Industries, Inc. v. Ber-
man, 423 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Penn., 1976); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del.
1976); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Miller v.
Schwiekert 413 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,683 (95,713) (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
41420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976).
[Vol. 54:317
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company had developed a laser tool to be used in the construction in-
dustry, but had developed capital problems attempting to market the
product. Prior to sale of the stock the defendants prepared a financial
statement showing sales to the tool to several distributors as accounts
receivable of the corporation. After purchasing the corporation, plaintiff
learned that some of the sales had merely been consignment ar-
rangements with distributors. The plaintiff then sued the defendant's ac-
countants for knowingly or recklessly misrepresenting, in the financial
statement, the number of sales.
The court characterized the issue and facts of the case by saying:
The issue which must be determined is whether on the facts
presented in this record, Schiavi's conduct in the preparation
of the financial statement constituted such reckless and/or
knowing misbehavior as to warrant imposition of liability
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For reasons articulated
more fully in a subsequent portion of this opinion, Schiavi's
conduct constitutes far more than mere negligence, but falls
short of a preconceived actual intent to defraud His behavior
embraces both actual knowledge of material facts not revealed
and reckless disregard for the truth.4 2
The court then declared Hochfelder inapplicable to the case, but
discussed it as a basis for analysis, 43 concluding that good faith is not a
defense for reckless behavior,44 and the Circuit Court's definition of
scienter was controlling rather than Hochfelder's.45 Relying on that
analysis the court looked to Third Circuit cases and extended current
holdings by analogy.46 The court concluded:
"cL at 1080 (emphasis added).
43 Having limited its decision to the necessity for scienter and having expressly
noted it was leaving open the question of whether recklessness constituted in-
tentional conduct arising to the requisite degree of scienter for purposes of
imposing civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it is concluded
Hochfelder should not be treated as being in any way dispositive of the issue
before this Court.
However, Hochfelder does serve as a starting point for analysis.
Id. at 1080.
" While section 10(b) "should be interpreted no more broadly," there is not need
or justification for construing it more narrowly. Since a good faith defense is
appropriate only in negligence actions, one may conclude that Congress in-
tended 10(b) to govern reckless, knowing, or deliberate conduct, none of which
are negatived by the defense of good faith.
Id. at 1081.
""Finally, the Supreme Court having explicitly left undefined the perimeters of scienter,
the law of the Circuit Courts controls." Id. at 1081.
46 The Third Circuit position on scienter is developing cautiously. Thus far, it
has not required an actual intent to defraud but rather has acknowledged that
"there is considerable authority against interpreting a scienter requirement
as equivalent to a showing of intent to defraud." Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1974). Specifically, the Third Circuit has
held in non-disclosure cases that "[d]efendant was under a duty to disclose all
material facts to plaintiff, and his failure to do so when he had actual
knowledge of those facts satisfies any scienter requirement." Id. at 407-08.
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I find no rational reason why actual knowledge of omitted
material facts, sufficient to establish scienter in non-disclosure
cases, is not equally sufficient in this case of misrepresentation
where defendant has knowledge of either the actual
misrepresentation or the material omissions. Accordingly, I
find the requisite scienter essential to liability under 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 is present in the form of knowing misconduct, in
that Schiavi had actual knowledge of material facts which he
failed to disclose in his opinion audit.47
Accordingly, if the defendant accountant has knowledge that the facts
constitute misrepresentation, the scienter requirement is met.48 This is
exactly the situation presented by an ASR 150 violation. A typical
scenario might run as follows: an accountant becomes aware of a fact that
might need disclosure, questions whether ASR 150 requires the use of
FASB or non-FASB principles, consciously decides that FASB prin-
ciples apply (which require no disclosure), and later is found to have made
an incorrect choice of principles.
In holding the defendant accountant liable, the court in McLean ex-
pressly correlated knowing misbehavior with reckless misbehavior. 49
"There is little reason to distinguish between knowing misbehavior and
reckless misbehavior under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In practice, one
who recklessly makes a statement inherently possesses some knowledge
of its falsity."50
Accord, Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc. 524 F.2d 577, 584 (3d Cir. 1975); Fenster-
macher v. Philadelphia National Bank, 493 F.2d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1082. (Footnotes in quote omitted).
'Id. (Footnote in quote omitted).
48Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,496, n.45 (1978). There the court
states:
Defendants argue that an "actual knowledge" or "knowing conduct" stan-
dard requires not only knowledge of the omitted information, but also
knowledge that the information will mislead investors. There is no indication
inRochez, supra that the latter type of knowledge is required. Most securities
cases which apply a standard of knowing conduct refer only to knowledge of
the omitted information.
49 The failure to disclose the material information in this case was neither in-
advertent, compare SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. at 1242, nor
the product of simple forgetfulness, see Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 553 F.2d at 1045 n. 20, but instead the result of a conscious decision
made by the defendants. In view of the obviousness of the danger that in-
vestors would be misled by their failure to disclose the material information,
such conduct must be considered reckless.
SEC v. Nat. Student Marketing Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,540, p. 94, 198 (1978).
The difference, therefore, between the factual situation before the Supreme
Court in Hochfelder... and the case before us involving affirmative acts by
Laventhol which were materially misleading, is clear. The accountants here
are not being cast in damages for negligent nonfeasance or misfeasance, but
because of their actual participation in the preparation and issuance of false
and materially misleading accounting reports upon which Herzfeld relied to
his damage.
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwa orwath 540_F.2d 27, 37 1nd Cir. 1976).
-420 F. Supp. at 1084.
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A possible explanation for equating knowing misbehavior with
reckless behavior is offered by Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc.:
A final basis for applying a recklessness standard in certain in-
stances rests perhaps on the practical problem of proof in
private enforcement under the securities laws. Proof of a defen-
dant's knowledge or intent will often be inferential... and
cases thus of necessity cast in terms of recklessness. To re-
quire in all types of 10b-5 case that a factfinder must find a
specific intent to deceive or defraud would for all intents and
purposes disembowel the private cause of action under Section
10(b)."
Bloomenthal carries this explanation one step further by stating:
Scienter even in its strictest form can be alleged and in some
instances proven, at least to the satisfaction of the fact finder.
Such intent, typically, must necessarily be proven by drawing
inferences, and the fact that false and misleading statements
have been made, along with other circumstances established
by the evidence, may be sufficient to lead to the inference that
such representations were made with an intent to deceive.
52
This practice of permitting inferences, if not properly confined, could
lead to liability for accountants for conduct that is merely negligent, but
called by a different name. In fact, this may have already happened in
cases like McLean.
With respect to 10b-5 liability, accountants currently appear to be in
worse shape than before the Hochfelder decision. Even though
accountants could be held liable for negligence prior to Hochfelder, the
defense of good faith was available to them. Cases since Hochfelder have
eroded its protection by blurring the distinction between negligence and
the various forms of reckless behavior, and more importantly by holding
that the defense of good faith is no longer available. With this erosion,
scienter appears to provide little protection for accountants in the type of
situation in which ASR 150 would be involved.
CONFUSION OVER GAAP
A separate question raised by the issuance of ASR 150 is its impact
upon the concept of "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP).
GAAP is a phrase commonly used to identify the consensus at a par-
ticular time of the proper accounting principles and practices. Although
there is reference to the term in eight different SEC regulations,53 neither
the SEC or federal courts have defined it. In 1970 the AICPA attempted
to define GAAP in Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4 (APB
11[1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,275, p. 92,774 (2nd Cir. 1978).
523 A.H. BLOOMENTHAL. SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPOkATE LAW §9.21[4][f] at 9-13
(rev. 1977).
--17 C.F.R. §2-46.17a5(c)(2)(i) (1977), 240.11al-l(t)(e) (1976), 210.7A-02(a), -06(c) (19'f4),
230.434a (a)(2) (1973), 230.610a (1968).
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4). It seems that the SEC would have defined GAAP itself had it been
dissatisfied with the AICPA definition.5 4 This is especially true since
every regulation but one, which mentions GAAP, has either been pro-
mulgated or amended since APB 4 was issued by the AICPA.
Nowhere in the AICPA definition does it state that AICPA pro-
nouncements5 5 are the exclusive source of GAAP in areas covered by
AICPA pronouncements, only that they are GAAP per se. Rule 203 of
the Rules of Conduct of the Code of Professional Ethics does require
general compliance with AICPA pronouncements, currently stated as
FASB pronouncements, but that applies only to members of the AICPA.
Since Rule 203 is a rule of conduct it would not affect the definition of
GAAP in APB 4. Thus, it may be assumed that prior to the issuance of
ASR 150, GAAP was defined by the AICPA, for SEC purposes, and in-
cluded principles other than FASB principles which could have been in
fact contrary to FASB principles.
Footnote 1 of APB 4 enumerates the relationship between GAAP and
substantial authoritative support:
Inasmuch as generally accepted accounting principles embody
a concensus, they depend on notions such as general accep-
tance and substantial authoritative support, which are not
precisely defined. The Securities and Exchange Commission
indicated in Accounting Series Release No. 4 that when finan-
cial statements are "prepared in accordance with accounting
principles for which there is no substantial authoritative sup-
port, such financial statements will be presumed to be
misleading or inaccurate .... " The AICPA Special Committee
on Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board defines
generally accepted accounting principles as those "having
substantial authoritative support."
Thus, at least implicit in the definition of GAAP is the requirement that
the principle have substantial authoritative support. This is where ASR
150 is significant. It states in absolute terms that principles contrary to
FASB pronouncements are deemed not to have substantial authoritative
support. The exception for deviation from FASB principles contained in
the footnote of ASR 150 would not affect this statement. Thus, for SEC
purposes, ASR 150 has reduced the number of accounting principles that
qualify as GAAP. Admittedly, this reduction is achieved directly by the
force of ASR 150 alone. However, this analysis shows that the meanings
of the eight regulations that reference the term GAAP have been
changed indirectly without any showing of intent to do so.
54This assumption is based upon the fact that the AICPA definition is the only formal
definition.55FASB was not created until 1973, supra note 2.
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CONCLUSION
The apparent purpose of ASR 150 was to recognize pronouncements of
FASB as a source of accounting principles acceptable to the SEC. Had
the SEC promulgated a rule to accomplish that and no more, the rule
would have been well received. However, the SEC has promulgated a rule
which establishes an ambiguous standard of compliance, potentially in-
creases accountants' civil liability, and alters the definition of GAAP. If
the SEC desired to achieve either of the latter two results, they should
have done so directly. Acceptable accounting principles for SEC
purposes should be formulated with greater care to prevent such un-
necessary consequences.
RONALD E. LARGE

